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I. Introduction
Congress and states are developing and implementing plans to
mitigate the impact of climate change through measures that reduce 
greenhouse gases.  Many of these efforts are focused on the electrical 
generation industry since approximately 40% of carbon dioxide emissions in 
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the United States are created from burning fossil fuels to generate 
electricity.1  To reduce the greenhouse gases produced by the electrical 
industry sector, many greenhouse reduction plans have required increased 
generation of electricity through renewable, less-polluting, resources.2  In 
fact, the majority of states have now enacted a “renewable portfolio 
standard” (“RPS”),3 which mandates electric utilities to obtain a percentage 
of their power from renewable resources.4  Congress has attempted to follow 
suit by proposing several different versions of legislation for a national RPS.5  
One of the most aggressive RPS requirements is in California, which 
requires 20% of the state’s energy to be generated from renewable resources 
by 2010 and 33% by 2020.6  Although California has expended significant 
resources towards meeting its RPS, it did not meet its 20% goal by 2010.7  
Despite failing to meet its RPS targets, California utilities have justified 
continuing to build many new natural gas facilities by arguing that more 
natural gas capacity is necessary to backup renewables.  California’s large 
natural gas capacity, however, was not necessary for meeting its 20% RPS 
target.  Indeed, this building rush has resulted in California currently 
operating at an extraordinarily high reserve margin, which is forecasted to be 
34.5% during the summer’s peak of 2010 (only 15% to 17% is necessary for 
1. See Energy Info. Agency, Electricity and the Environment (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_environment.   
2. See B. Metz, et. al., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE. SUMMARY
FOR POLICY MAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP
III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2007) (recommending that policy makers reduce reliance on fossil fuel 
generated electricity as part of any climate change mitigation plan).   
3. See, e.g., Pew Center for Climate Change, Renewable and Alternative Energy
Standards, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rps.cfm (last 
updated Dec. 14, 2009) (noting that some states refer to their standards as 
Alternative Energy Standards rather than Renewable Portolio Standards). 
4. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards,
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm (last
updated June 16, 2009); see also Pew Center for Climate Change, Renewable and 
Alternative Energy Standards, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/ 
what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rps.cfm (last updated Dec. 14, 2009). 
5. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. §§702-03 (2009); see also H.R. 3221, 110th Cong., Subtitle H, § 9211 (2008).  The 
2007 national RPS bill passed the House of Representatives on August 4, 2007, but a 
similar version did not pass in the Senate.   
6. See infra at Section I (summarizing California’s requirements); see also Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, California Renewable Portfolio Standards, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
7. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report,
(4th Q. 2010) at 2, available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/CFD76016-3E28-
44B0-8427-3FAB1AA27FF4/0/FourthQuarter2010RPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf. 
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backup).8  
Not only is this large natural capacity expensive for California 
ratepayers, it inhibits renewable development.  To meet its RPS in the 
future, California will need to change course and stop doing business as 
usual.  California is not alone in its failure to meet its renewable 
requirements.  Other states will also likely fail to meet their renewable 
standards9 and can learn from California’s experience.  
This article will examine and describe some reasons why California did 
not meet its renewable target in 2010.  California’s failure is attributable to 
the confluence of several factors that resulted in the procurement of large 
amounts of new natural gas facilities despite not meeting renewable 
requirements and already high reserve margins.  Three prominent reasons 
for California’s failure to meet its RPS are decentralized administration of its 
RPS program, the lack of strong enforcement provisions, and California’s 
extensive reliance on utility information instead of an independent analysis. 
Moving forward, California should enact enforceable clear requirements that 
are administered by one centralized agency, which conducts an independent 
assessment of renewable policies and goals. 
II. Background
A. Renewable Portfolio Standards Generally
Renewable Portfolio Standards require that a certain percentage of 
electricity production be generated from renewable energy sources.10  Initial 
discussions related to developing and designing a RPS began in California 
in 1995.11  Although California’s RPS was not adopted until 2002, these 
initial discussions spurred national interest and several states adopted RPS 
requirements in the late 1990s.12   
8. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, 2010 Summer Peak Forecast, http://www.
caiso.com/2793/2793ae4d395f2.pdf. 
9. See B. RABE, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF
U.S. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (2006) (discussing how Massachusetts and 
Nevada were behind in compliance with their renewable standards).   
10. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards,
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last 
updated June 16, 2009). 
11. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Renewables Working Group to the California Public
Utilities Commission, CPUC No. 50-96-08 (Aug. 1996).  Minnesota and Iowa had 
renewable policies that predate this discussion, but they were only later labeled RPS 
policies.  See R. Wiser & C. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States 1-2 (Apr. 2007) 
(discussing the history of RPS development), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ 
ems/reports/62569.pdf. 
12. Id.
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RPS policies have been promulgated mostly through legislation.13  The 
majority of states in the United States now have some form of a RPS with 
various requirements and enforcement provisions.14  As of October 2010, 
thirty-five states had some sort of RPS requirement or goal.15  Some states, 
however, only have voluntary requirements.16  
RPS requirements can vary greatly in their structure, size, application, 
coverage of types of renewable energy, and administration.17  For example, 
some RPSs specify that renewable energy must be based on total generation 
while others are calculated on installed capacity.18  RPS policies also differ in 
the types of renewable resources that are covered.  Some renewable 
resources such as wind, solar, and geothermal, are eligible in the majority of 
states, but others, such as biomass and hydropower, vary greatly from state 
to state.19  RPS requirements generally apply to investor owned utilities and 
sometimes also to publicly owned utilities.20 
A number of purposes have been suggested for RPS policies including 
lowering energy prices and encouraging innovation.21  The primary stated 
purpose of RPSs is motivating renewable energy development to achieve 
13. Id. (noting that a few states have also adopted RPS policies through
regulations and voter initiatives).  
14. See C. Fischer & L. Preonas, Res. for the Future, Combining Policies for
Renewable Energy: Is the Whole Less than the Sum of Its Parts? at 5 (Mar. 2010). 
15. See Pew Center for Global Climate Change, Renewable and Alternative Energy
Portfolio Standards, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_ 
the_states/rps.cfm (last updated Oct. 27, 2010). 
16. For example, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah have voluntary
requirements.  See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last 
updated June 16, 2009). 
17. Id. R. Wiser & C. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Renewable
Portfolio Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States (Apr. 2007) 
(describing how these design differences are important because they allow the states 
to serve as laboratories).   
18. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards,
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last 
updated June 16, 2009) (noting that Texas’s RPS is based on total capacity while 
California’s RPS is based on generation). 
19. R. Wiser & C. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Renewable Portfolio
Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States (Apr. 2007).   
20. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards,
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last 
updated June 16, 2009); R. Wiser & C. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States (Apr. 
2007).   
21. See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n on Energy Pol’y, Energy Policy Recommendations to the
President and the 110th Congress (Apr. 2007). 
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environmental enhancement and increased energy security.22  Studies have 
shown that RPS standards can achieve this goal by motivating renewable 
energy development.23 
California’s RPS is one of the most aggressive in the United States, 
which is not that surprising since California has often taken a leadership role 
in energy issues.24  Indeed, California has already enacted multiple measures 
that require reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases.  In particular, it 
requires new power plants to meet an emissions performance standard for 
carbon dioxide.25  In addition, California’s climate change requirements are 
considered more detailed and comprehensive than the requirements in 
other states.26 
B. California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard
In 2002, the California Legislature established California’s first RPS, 
which required that 20% of energy from its investor-owned utilities come 
from renewable resources by 2017.27  This initial RPS was later accelerated in 
2006.28  California’s RPS now requires that 20% of energy come from 
renewable resources by the end of 2010.29  Renewable resources include 
solar, wind, small hydro, and biomass facilities.30  The RPS Program also 
requires utilities to increase procurement from renewable energy resources 
by at least 1% of their retail sales annually, until they reach 20% by 2010.31  
California law further mandates a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to 
22. See D. Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy Practices:
Renewable Portfolio Standards at 2 (July 2008). 
23. See M. Fredric & S. Vachon, The Effectiveness of Different Policy Regimes for
Promoting Wind Power: Experience from the States, 34 ENERGY POLICY 1786 (2006). 
24. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 63, 70 (2008) (discussing California’s energy efficiency decisions to 
go beyond federal requirements).   
25. S.B. 1368, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); see also Cal. Energy
Comm’n, Discussion of Senate Bill 1368, available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
emission_standards/index.html.  
26. See B. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF
AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 141-43 (2004).  Other states, however, have adopted 
requirements for greater reductions than in California.   
27. See S.B. 1078, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
28. S.B. 107, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
29. Id. (allowing utilities to have a three year compliance period if they fail to
meet the target). 
30. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12 (2010).
31. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (2010).
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1990 levels by 2020.32  The cornerstone of the state’s plan for meeting this 
greenhouse gas requirement is the RPS.33  Consequently, achieving the RPS 
has been called a central goal of California and its agencies.34   
In November 2008, Executive Order S-14-08 further accelerated 
California’s 20% RPS goal by requiring that “all retail sellers of electricity”35 
serve their load with 33% of energy coming from renewable energy by 2020.36  
Consistent with these requirements, California has enacted an energy action 
plan, which prioritizes energy efficiency and renewable energy over fossil 
fuel generation.37   
The California Public Utilities Code articulates a wide range of 
purposes of the RPS requirements including promoting stable electricity 
prices, protection of public health, improvement of environmental quality, 
stimulation of sustainable economic development, creation of new 
employment opportunities, and reduced reliance on imported fuels.38  
California agencies have articulated other reasons for increasing renewable 
procurement including concerns about the reliability and price fluctuation of 
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500, et. seq. (2010); see also Press Release
from Office of the Governor: Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Executive Order to Advance 
State’s Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard to 33 Percent by 2020 (Sept. 15, 2009).   
33. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision Re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards into Procurement Policies, D.08-10-037 at 3 (Oct. 16, 2008), available at 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/FINAL_DECISION/92591.htm (“We emphasize that 
the foundation for success to reduce GHG emissions in the electricity sector is more 
energy efficiency and further development of renewable energy sources such as wind, 
solar, geothermal, and biomass.”); id. at 4 (“Renewable resources are essential for 
reducing GHG emissions and reaching AB 32 goals, and are a crucial aspect of the 
future low-carbon economy that will be required to meet California’s 2050 climate 
goals.”).   
34. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (2010); see also § 701.3; § 701.4 (“It is the policy of
the state and the intent of the Legislature that state and municipal electric resource 
acquisition programs recognize and include a value for the resource diversity 
provided by renewable resources.”); Cal. Pub. Utilities Commission, Decision D.07-
12-052 at 42, 74 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_
pdf/FINAL_DECISION/76979.pdf (recognizing the importance of achieving the
renewable standards).
35. In contrast, the 20% requirement only applies to investor-owned utilities.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (2010). 
36. Cal. Executive Order S-14-08 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://gov.
ca.gov/executive-order/11072; see also S.B. 2X1, 2010-11 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) 
(bill currently under consideration by the California legislature that would mandate 
the 33% RPS requirement).  
37. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Integrate and Refine Procurement Policies Underlying
Long-Term Procurement Plans, Rulemaking 08-02-007 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/78966.pdf. 
38. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(b) (2010).
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natural gas.39  For example, the RPS mitigates “the risk of relying heavily on 
natural gas by reducing demand for natural gas for power generation 
through greater reliance on renewable generation.”40  Thus, lowering the 
reliance on natural gas through a higher RPS “would mitigate consumers’ 
exposure to natural gas price risk likely to come as demand for natural gas 
intensifies and supply diminishes.”41  
Furthermore, increased procurement of fossil fuel resources could 
crowd out renewables.  The California Public Utilities Commission has 
warned that a utility should not “crowd out preferred resources and/or 
systematically over procure.”42  As it further stated, “AB 32 and Senate Bill 
(SB) 1368, California’s Climate Change laws, provid[e that] . . . procurement 
must now consider carbon risk when filling net short positions with fossil 
resources, so as not to ‘crowd out’ preferred resources.”43   
Several agencies have responsibilities related to the implementation 
of the RPS including the California Public Utilities Commission, the 
California Energy Commission, and the California Air Resources Board.  The 
California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) has authority to take all 
“appropriate action” to ensure that utilities meet the RPS goal.44  As part of 
its responsibilities, California law requires the CPUC to “ensure that the 
most cost-effective and efficient investments in renewable energy resources 
are vigorously pursued.”45  In this pursuit, the CPUC’s long term goal is “a 
fully competitive and self-sustaining supply of electricity generated from 
renewable sources.”46  In pursuit of this goal, the CPUC started incorporating 
the 33% target as a policy goal in 2009.47  For local publicly owned electric 
39. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision Re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards into Procurement Policies, D. 08-10-037 at 3 (Oct. 16, 2008). 
40. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision Re Policies and Cost Recovery Mechanism for
Generation Procurement and Renewable Resource Development Respondents: Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, et. al., D. 04-01-050 at 65 (Jan. 22, 2004), available at http://docs. 
cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/33625.pdf.   
41. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Decision, Re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards into Procurement Policies, D. 08-10-037 at 42 (Oct. 16, 2008).  
42. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision 07-12-052 at 42 (Dec. 20, 2007).
43. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 08-02-007 at 1 (Feb. 14, 2008).
44. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.13, 399.14(e), 399.15(a) (2010).
45. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740.5(a) (2010).
46. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740.5(b) (2010).
47. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Rulemaking 08-08-009 (Dec. 17, 2009); Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm’n, Decision 09-12-041 (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://docs. 
cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/111795.pdf; see also Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
Final Opinion on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies, Decision 08-10-037 at 92 (Oct. 16, 
2008) (“We pledge to use our best efforts and to support the efforts of others to 
achieve 33% renewables by 2020.”). 
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utilities, their own governing body, rather than the CPUC, enforces the RPS.48  
These local publicly owned electric utilities and investor owned utilities are 
both required to submit annual reports detailing their progress toward 
meeting the RPS to the CEC.49 
Despite its efforts, California has consistently failed to meet its RPS 
goals, and did not meet its 20% target by the end of 2010.50  Recent 
estimates show that only around 18% of California’s electricity came from 
renewable sources in 2010.51  In addition, renewable deliveries in California 
only increased 1.4% since the RPS was promulgated in 2003 and 2009.52  
Notably, between 2002 and January 2007, only 242 megawatts (“MW”) of 
additional renewables came on-line.53  Consequently, there were “several 
years of fairly static energy production from renewable resources.”54  More 
recently, the percentage has increased because California utilities have 
signed short-term contracts with out of state resources.55  In the event that a 
utility fails to meet its RPS mandates, the California Public Utility Code 
requires the utility to “procure additional eligible renewable energy 
resources in subsequent years to compensate for the shortfall.”56   
48. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 387(a) (2010) (“Each governing body of a local
publicly owned electric utility, as defined in Section 9604, shall be responsible for 
implementing and enforcing a renewable portfolio standard that recognizes the 
intent of the Legislature to encourage renewable resources, while taking into 
consideration the effect of the standard on rates, reliability, and financial resources 
and the goal of environmental improvement.”).   
49. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 387(b) (2010).
50. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Integration of Renewable Resources, Operational
Requirements and Generation Fleet Capability at 20% RPS, at 1 (Aug. 2010); Cal. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report (Apr. 2008) at 11, available at 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/REPORT/85936.pdf); see also Cal. Energy Comm’n, 
Report On Progress Of Publicly Owned Utilities In Implementing Renewable Portfolio Standards at 
30, 33 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-300-
2008-005/CEC-300-2008-005.PDF; Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Renewables Portfolio 
Standard Quarterly Report, (4th Q. 2010) at 2, available at http://www.cpuc. 
ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/CFD76016-3E28-44B0-8427-3FAB1AA27FF4/0/FourthQuarter2010 
RPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf. 
51. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, California Renewables Portfolio Standards, http://
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/index.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2010). 
52. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report (2d Q.
2010), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/66FBACA7-173F-47FF-A5F4-
BE8F9D70DD59/0/Q22010RPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf. 
53. See Cal. Energy Comm’n, Integrated Energy Policy Report, 2006 Update, Report
100-2006-001-CMF at 4 (Jan. 2007).
54. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Integration of Renewable Resources, Operational
Requirements and Generation Fleet Capability at 20% RPS, at 3 (Aug. 2010). 
55. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Integration of Renewable Resources, Operational
Requirements and Generation Fleet Capability at 20% RPS, at 3 (Aug. 2010). 
56. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.15(b)(4) (2010).
 West  Northwest, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 2011 
171 
III. Reasons Why California Failed to Reach Its 20% Goal by
2010
Several factors contributed to California’s failure to meet its 2010 
target.  California agencies largely blamed independent factors for its failure 
to meet RPS goals rather than taking a closer look at the RPS program itself. 
In a report to the Legislature, the CPUC cited transmission, permitting 
issues, and developer inexperience as reasons why it was failing to meet 
RPS goals.57  Although each of these reasons likely was a factor in the failure, 
there are more central reasons why California’s RPS has not been effective. 
In general, most authorities believe RPS standards are associated with 
higher renewable development.58  Failing to develop renewable energy and 
meet renewable goals can be due to a variety of factors unrelated to RPS 
design.59  For example, other factors such as grid enhancement or contractor 
licensing can play a role.60  In particular, a study by the National Renewable 
Energy Lab concluded that “two external factors [that] have the most impact 
on what an RPS can accomplish on a large scale: available resources (e.g., 
wind, solar radiation, geothermal potential, or biomass stocks); and 
available transmission capacity.”61  Other studies have similarly found that 
RPS results depend on transmission policy.62   
California’s RPS, however, likely did not increase renewable 
development since California only has increased development by a small 
percentage over the life of its RPS.63  Thus, the design of California’s RPS is 
likely a central, but not the only, reason for California’s shortfall. 
57. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report
(Jan. 2008).   
58. See E. Brown & S. Busche, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., State of the States
2008: Renewable Energy Development and the Role of Policy (Oct. 2008), available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/43021.pdf (finding that the “[e]xistence of an RPS is 
also significantly correlated to higher renewable percentages of overall electricity 
generation”). 
59. See D. Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy Practices:
Renewable Portfolio Standards at 2 (July 2008). 
60. See E. Brown & S. Busche, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., State of the States
2008: Renewable Energy Development and the Role of Policy (Oct. 2008), available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/43021.pdf.   
61. D. Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy Practices:
Renewable Portfolio Standards at 3 (July 2008). 
62. Id. at 1 (“States with an RPS that have significantly increased renewable
resources either have available transmission, or have developed strategies to build 
it.”).   
63.  See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report (2d
Q. 2010), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/66FBACA7-173F-47FF-A5F4-
BE8F9D70DD59/0/Q22010RPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf.
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California’s RPS design has fundamental shortcomings that contributed to 
California’s failure to meet its target because it has no central authority and 
lacks strong enforcement provisions.  Experience has shown that if a RPS is 
not appropriately designed, it is unlikely to lead to increased in renewable 
generation.64  In addition to its design issues, California has relied 
extensively on utilities rather than independent assessments to its 
detriment.   
A. California’s RPS Has Overlapping and Unclear Lines of
Authority
California’s RPS program is administered by several different agencies 
with overlapping authority.  The California Public Utilities Code 
contemplates that the California Energy Commission (“CEC”) and the 
California Public Utilities Commission share responsibilities for 
implementing the RPS.65  The Code also acknowledges that the RPS Program 
and the Renewable Energy Resources Program administered by the CEC are 
two overlapping programs that are intended to be complementary.66 
In addition to the Code having overlapping authority, Executive Orders 
S-14-08 and S-21-09, which established the 33% renewable target, also
create overlapping authority.  In particular, Executive Order S-14-08 directs
the CEC and requests the CPUC and the California Independent System
Operator (“CAISO”) to work together with stakeholders to identify how and
where renewable energy can be developed.67  Executive Order S-21-09 also
requires the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) to work with the CEC
and the CPUC to ensure that a regulation requiring renewable energy
sources is adopted.68  S-21-09 further requires the CPUC and the CEC to
“provide advice and assistance to, and cooperate with” the California Air
Resources Board in its implementation of a RPS related regulation and, in
doing so, the CARB can delegate policy related responsibilities to these
agencies.69
64. See O. Langniss & R. Wiser, The Renewables Portfolio Standard in Texas: An Early
Assessment, 31 ENERGY POLICY 527, 528 (2003).  
65. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (2010).
66. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(d) (2010).
67. Cal. Exec. Order S-14-08 at Paragraphs 14, 15 and 17 (“In conjunction with
its work with DFG to develop the DRECP pursuant to number 7 above and any work it 
performs to facilitate the siting and permitting of renewable generation and 
transmission projects, the CEC shall coordinate with BLM, CPUC, the Cal. Indep. Sys. 
Operator, and other interested federal, state, and local agencies, work closely with 
interested stakeholders, and utilize input from RETI.”). 
68. Cal. Exec. Order S-21-09.
69. Id. (“The ARB may delegate to the PUC and the CEC any policy
development or program implementation responsibilities that would reduce 
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Transmission related issues are also handled by several agencies.  The 
CAISO has primary responsible for managing transmission.70  But this 
responsibility is shared with the CPUC, which requires utilities to obtain a 
certification of public convenience and necessity to use ratepayer generated 
money for transmission projects.71  Transmission planning responsibilities 
also overlap with a number of regional planning initiatives examining 
transmission issues including the California Renewable Transmission 
Initiative, the California Transmission Planning Group, and the Western 
Renewable Energy Zones initiative.   
Due to the structure of the statute and executive orders, virtually every 
aspect of RPS implementation involves multiple agencies.  For example, the 
CPUC handles renewable procurement issues,72 and it requires utilities to 
submit renewable procurement plans to it for review and acceptance, 
modification, or rejection.73  Other agencies like the CEC and the CAISO do, 
nevertheless, make procurement related recommendations to the CPUC.  In 
fact, the CEC made recommendations in its Integrated Energy Policy Report 
during the 2006 Long Term Procurement Plan.74  The CEC also generates the 
demand forecast that is intended to be the basis of procurement related 
decisions.75 
In addition, multiple agencies often opine on the same issue and 
publish overlapping, and at times inconsistent, reports and 
recommendations.  For example, in a recent CPUC planning proceeding, the 
CPUC, the CAISO, and a utility presented models to attempt to predict 
duplication and improve consistency with other energy programs such as demand 
response, energy efficiency and energy storage.”). 
70. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 345.5(b) (2010).
71. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1001 (2010) (this is a requirement for
jurisdictional utilities).   
72. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, RPS Program Overview, 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/overview.htm (last modified Sept. 
22, 2009) (describing CPUC’s interpretation of its authority).   
73. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.14; Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision D.03-
06-071 (June 19, 2003), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/FINAL_
DECISION/27360.htm.
74. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision 07-12-052 at 12 (Dec. 20, 2007); Cal.
Energy Comm’n, 2005 Integrated Energy Resource Plan, available at http:// 
www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-100-2005-007/CEC-100-2005-007-CMF.PDF 
(describing CEC’s recommendations, which include implementing the Energy Action 
Plan and requiring more transparency in energy planning and procurement). 
75. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.5 (2010) (specifically mentioning the CEC
forecasts for use in long term procurement plan proceedings); see also Cal. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, Decision 07-12-052 (Dec. 20, 2007) (discussing its use of the most recent 
CEC forecast).   
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renewable needs.76  Multiple agencies have also issued their own reports on 
particular aspects related to the RPS such as energy storage.77  In addition to 
overlapping authority being resource intensive, different agencies may make 
decisions on the same matter, which causes inconsistent results and makes 
compliance difficult to monitor.78  Inconsistent positions in overlapping 
areas have the potential to cause serious conflicts.79  In the past, the CEC 
and the CPUC have almost competed against each other by creating similar 
overlapping greenhouse gases related policies.80  This can still be seen today 
in the various competing reports issued by the agencies.   
To attempt to deal with overlapping authority issues, agencies have 
signed memoranda of understanding to explicitly delineate the 
responsibilities of agencies.  For example, the CAISO and the CPUC signed a 
memorandum of understanding to work together and coordinate on 
resource and transmission planning issues.81  The CPUC believes that this 
coordination and consistency between assumptions is desirable to reduce 
the risk of legal challenges to determinations of need for a transmission 
line.82  In addition to memoranda of understanding, California agencies have 
committed that: “[w]here appropriate, inter-agency collaboration will be 
76. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 10-05-006; Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, History of LTPP, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Procurement/LTPP/ 
ltpp_history.htm (providing links to models provided in proceeding).   
77. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Electric Energy Storage: An Assessment of
Potential Barriers and Opportunities (July 9, 2010), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
NR/rdonlyres/71859AF5-2D26-4262-BF52-62DE85C0E942/0/CPUCStorageWhitePaper 
7910.pdf; Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Integration of Energy Storage Technology: White Paper - 
Identification of Issues and Proposed Solutions (May 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.caiso.com/1fd5/1fd56f931140.pdf.   
78. See, e.g., D. Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy
Practices: Renewable Portfolio Standards at 5 (July 2008) . 
79. See T. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy Through
Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission System Investments, 
34 VERMONT L. REVIEW 711, 748, 750 (2010) (arguingthat the largest coordination issue 
arises “in the arena of meeting California’s ambitious RPS and ensuring that 
adequate transmission is available to ship renewables power to markets.”). 
80. See J Malaczynski & T. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emission from Vehicle
Miles Traveled: Integrating the California Environmental Quality Act with the California Global 
Warming Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 71, 105 (2009).   
81. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator and Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Memorandum
of Understanding (May 13, 2010), available at http://www.caiso.com/2799/ 
2799bf542ee60.pdf.   
82. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report 10-
11 (3d Q. 2010), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/6472286E-6372-
47CF-9F3D-2D2C3100BF6D/0/Q32010QuarterlyRPSReporttotheLegislature.pdf.   
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deepened to advance these and other policy goals.”83  Problematically, 
however, these memoranda of understanding are not enforceable and are 
only followed if an agency is willing.  The overlapping authority inherent in 
California’s RPS design will continue to cause issues related to 
inconsistencies, control, and wasted resources, hampering the achievement 
of the RPS’s goals. 
B. California’s RPS Lacks a Strong Enforcement
Mechanism
States have promulgated a variety of mechanisms to administer RPS 
policies such as compliance verification, filing requirements, certification of 
renewable generators, contracting standards, and flexibility mechanisms.84  
Flexible compliance measures have been enacted largely as a response to 
risk and cost arguments.85  Many states are also creating renewable energy 
credits to ease compliance.86  Some of these have been effective 
enforcement mechanisms while others have weakened the ability of states 
to ensure compliance.   
California’s RPS administrative provisions include some weak 
provisions such as flexibility instruments and other, stronger provisions 
which require compliance verification and certification of eligible 
generators.87  The California Public Resources Code states a clear intent to 
“increase the amount of electricity generated from eligible renewable energy 
resources per year, so that it equals at least 20% of total retail sales of 
electricity in California per year by December 31, 2010.”88  The CPUC 
summarized the RPS requirements for load serving entities as: “(1) 20% by 
2010, (2) increase in annual procurement by 1%, (3) report on progress; (4) 
use of flexible compliance; and (5) uniform penalty provision.”89  Although 
83. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Clean Energy Future Implementation Plan at 23
(Sept. 2010), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC-100-2010-002/CEC-100-
2010-002-PLAN.PDF.   
84. See R. Wiser & C. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Renewable
Portfolio Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States (Apr. 2007). 
85. See, e.g., R. Wiser, K. Porter, & R. Grace, Evaluating Experience with Renewable
Portfolio Standards in the United States (Mar. 2004).  
86. See R. Wiser & C. Namovich, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Renewable
Portfolio Standards, A Factual Introduction to Experience in the United States (Apr. 2007).   
87. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, RPS Program Overview, available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/overview (last modified Sept. 22, 
2009).   
88. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740.
89. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision Re: Conditionally Accepting 2009
Renewables Portfolio Standard Procurement Plans and Integrated Resource Plan Supplements, 
D.09-06-018 at 8 (June 8, 2009), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/
FINAL_DECISION/102099.pdf.
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the list contains several concrete requirements, the RPS program does not 
have a strong mechanism to force compliance because several provisions 
allow the standards to be relaxed.  Indeed, the CPUC has called its 
compliance approach “flexibility with accountability” because it has “granted 
RPS-obligated utilities considerable flexibility in the way they satisfy RPS 
Program goals.”90  The result of these various provisions is that the 
compliance program is not stringent. 
California’s flexibility provisions are included in the RPS legislation, 
which states that the CPUC shall adopt “[f]lexible rules for compliance 
including, but not limited to, permitting electrical corporations to apply 
excess procurement in one year to subsequent years or inadequate 
procurement to one year to no more than the following three years.”91  These 
flexible rules can apply to any year, even years after the 20% standard has 
been met.92  In addition, the RPS legislation calls the annual procurement 
numbers “targets” rather than requirements.93   
California agencies further assume that utilities will be responsible for 
implementation of the RPS requirements.  The CPUC has summarized this 
compliance approach stating: “each utility may apply its own reasonable 
business judgment in running its solicitation, within the parameters we 
establish and the guidance we provide. Utilities ultimately remain 
responsible for program implementation, administration and success, 
within application of flexible compliance criteria.”94  In other words, utilities 
are primarily required to meet the procurement targets set forth in the 
flexible compliance criteria, which is different from the actual target under 
the statute.95  If a seller fails to procure sufficient renewable energy under 
this flexible regime, the CPUC can impose a penalty of five cents for every 
kilowatt hour the utility is short of the requirement with a cap of $25 million 
per year, but the CPUC has never imposed a non-compliance penalty on a 
utility.96  
The verification requirements under the RPS program also do not 
provide for a strong enforcement mechanism.  Verification is completed by 
the CEC not the CPUC.97  The CPUC has used contracted numbers rather 
90. See id. at 8-9.
91. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.14(a)(2)(C).
92. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.14(a)(2)(C)(i).
93. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.15(b).
94. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision 09-06-018 at 22 (June 8, 2009).
95. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Compliance Reporting, http://www.cpuc.
ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/compliance.htm.  
96. Id.; CPUC, Renewables, Compliance and Reporting, http://www.cpuc.
ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/compliance.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2011). 
97. See S.B. 1078, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. , Leg. Counsel’s Digest (Cal. 2002)
(“The bill would require the Energy Commission to certify eligible renewable energy 
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than the actual verified number in its reports to the legislature.98  Yet, the 
CEC believes that its verification is not legally required,99 and its verification 
does not occur until years later.100  The CEC’s verification also has little 
practical use since the CEC does not hold itself responsible for catching 
double-counting,101 and it does not determine compliance.102  Thus, the 
verification exercise only produces limited results.103  
The penalty provisions under the California RPS program also failed to 
provide a strong enforcement mechanism and thus likely contributed to its 
failure.  Strong penalty levels for noncompliance are an important part of a 
strong RPS design.105  The legislative counsel’s digest for the original RPS 
bill recognized the need for strong penalty provisions stating: “[b]ecause a 
violation of the Public Utilities Act or an order of the PUC is a crime under 
existing law, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program by 
creating a new crime.”106  The next bill, however, deleted this language.107   
Additionally, there are also not adequate enforcement provisions to 
prevent procurement of unviable projects.108  In other words, bidders are not 
deterred from proposing projects that are unlikely to be built.109  This has 
become a significant issue since many projects in California are predicted to 
fail and ultimately have failed.110  These failures are the result of various 
resources, to design and implement an accounting system to verify compliance with 
the renewables portfolio standard by retail sellers.”). 
98. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Progress of the California Renewable Portfolio
Standard, Report to the Legislature, First Quarter 2007 at 2 (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/GRAPHICS/63854.PDF. 
99. Cal. Energy Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard 2006 Procurement
Verification 2 (July 2010), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-
300-2009-006/CEC-300-2009-006-CMF.PDF.
100. For example, the 2006 verification was not finalized until July 2010.  See id.
at 2.  
101. Id. at v.
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id.
105. See e.g., D. Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy
Practices: Renewable Portfolio Standards at 5 (July 2008). 
106. S.B. 1078, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess., Leg. Counsel’s Digest (Cal. 2002).
107. See S.B. 107, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess., Leg. Counsel’s Digest (Cal. 2006).
108. See Langniss & Wiser, supra note 64, at 530.
109. Id. at 528 (contrasting California’s requirements with Texas’s
requirements).  
110. See, e.g., KEMA, Inc., Building a Margin of Safety into Renewable Energy
Procurements (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-
300-2006-004/CEC-300-2006-004.PDF.
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impediments including transmission, financing, siting, and permitting.111  A 
common reason for projects to fail is the difficulty of securing adequate 
transmission capacity,112 which should have surfaced and been resolved in 
the request for offer stage.  Notably, the Public Utilities Code requires that 
the criteria for the ranking and selection of resources include “needed 
transmission investments and ongoing utility expenses resulting from 
integrating and operating eligible renewable energy resources.”113  
Strong regulatory enforcement mechanisms are an important 
component of a successful RPS program.  California’s experiment with 
deregulation, in the late 1990s, showed why regulatory enforcement 
authorities are necessary.  Deregulation demonstrated that “light-handed 
regulation combined with the entrepreneurial profit-maximizing behavior of 
private participants in electricity markets does not serve the public well.”114  
Specifically, as one commentator articulated, “California’s failed 
‘deregulation’ experiment arose largely from the failure of California to 
create properly functioning market rules, lack of diligence in market 
oversight, and the expectation that antitrust law would cure that which it 
was not designed to cure: market ills cultivated by regulatory rules that 
legitimized anticompetitive conduct and made that conduct the norm.”115  
Put another way, markets “cannot be trusted to work without a high degree 
of government intervention.”116  California’s lack of a strong enforcement 
mechanism is likely a reason why it has failed to meet its 20% target.   
C. California’s Overreliance on Utilities Contributed to Its
Failure to Meet Its RPS Target
Given the lack of centralized authority and enforcement power, 
California has relied largely on utilities to provide information for RPS-
related decisions.  In particular, utilities have asserted that renewable 
energy projects need increasingly large amounts of natural gas reserves to 
backup renewables during periods of intermittency.117  Partly due to this 
111. See, e.g., Cal. Exec. Order S.14-08 (highlighting impediments to renewable
development).  
112. See, e.g., KEMA, Inc., Building a Margin of Safety into Renewable Energy
Procurements (Jan. 2006). 
113. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.14(a)(2)(B).
114. J. Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted?  The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron
on Energy Markets, 4 HOUSTON BUS. & TAX L. J. 1, 137-38 (2004).  
115. D. Bush & C. Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is To
Blame for California’s Power Woes, 83 OR. L. Rev. 207, 212 (2004).  
116. Weaver, supra  note 114, at 138.
117. See e.g., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision D.10-07-045 (July 29, 2010),
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/121605.pdf (discussing 
PG&E’s arguments for new natural gas capacity).   
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argument, California has approved increasingly large reserves of natural gas 
facilities, which has resulted in a reserve margin at least twice above what is 
necessary.118 
This continual approval of increased amounts of fossil fuel facilities is 
due largely to California’s overreliance on utilities’ analyses.  In fact, in 2006, 
the CPUC recognized that the utilities “are filling, and are projecting to fill, 
their respective net short positions with conventional resources to the effect 
of there being no room in . . . [the utilities’] . . . portfolio for other resources, 
or the conventional resources will be obsolete and result in large stranded 
costs.”119  Recognizing that its reliance on the utilities’ analyses was a 
problem, the CPUC called for a “highly developed analysis” with “analytical 
rigor” before future requests for fossil-fuel resources would be considered 
“legitimate.”120  The CPUC further provided that “[i]n subsequent iterations of 
the long-term procurement process, the IOUs [investor-owned utilities] will 
be expected in their resource planning to meet and exceed the high 
standards Californians expect as pacesetters on energy and environmental 
issues.”121  The CPUC had however issued this warning before to no avail. 
The failure of utilities to adhere to the California’s commitment to preferred 
resources was also an issue in a 2004 proceeding.122   
The development of more natural gas generating capacity is 
unnecessary and contrary to the purpose of a RPS,123 and likely crowding out 
increased development of greater renewable resources.  Indeed, the CEC 
found that new natural gas facilities are not currently needed to integrate 
renewable energy and meet RPS goals.124  This is true even considering the 
eventual phase out and retirement of several facilities.125  
California has also relied largely on the development of large remote 
renewable energy, which often has transmission and land use issues, due to 
its overreliance on utility data.  California’s reliance on large remote 
118. B. Powers, Today’s California Renewable Energy Strategy - Maximize Complexity
and Expense, 27:2 NAT. GAS & ELECTRICITY 19 (Sept. 2010).  
119. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision D.07-12-052 at 6 (Dec. 20, 2007).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision D.04-12-048 at Findings of Fact 54, 55
(Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/ 
43224.pdf. 
123. See D. Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., State Clean Energy Practices:
Renewable Portfolio Standards at 5 (July 2008) (“most straightforward measures of RPS 
effectiveness are the degree to which fossil fuels have declined as a share of the 
state’s electric-generation fuel mix”). 
124. See Cal. Energy Comm’n, Impact of Assembly Bill 32 Scoping Plan Electricity
Resource Goals on New Natural Gas-Fired Generation (2009) 
125. Id.
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renewable energy projects is in part due to its lack of evaluation of current 
information of more viable and less-environmentally harmful alternatives 
such as distributed solar generation.126  Utilities have incentives to seek 
remote renewable generation, which requires higher capital investment and 
transmission costs, since their rates are based on capital investment.127  
However, transmission related issues could cause contentious land use 
issues, which can lead to project failure.128  Project failures, which are the 
result of utilities not picking the most viable projects, have greatly hindered 
California’s ability to meet its RPS.129 
IV. Goals for Moving Forward
To meet California’s future energy goals, California will need to stop
doing business as usual and independently evaluate RPS issues.  Some 
incentives that are important for meeting the RPS targets are contrary to 
current utility incentives.  This inherent utility bias needs to be recognized, 
and strong compliance mechanisms related to contract viability and utility 
procurement need to be set to achieve better results.   
A. California Should Enact Strong Enforcement
Mechanisms
California agencies have recognized that its “agencies [need to] work in 
a more coordinated and efficient fashion.”130  Although this is a start, a plan 
by California’s agencies to work together does not assure that California’s 
goals will be met.  A strong compliance authority is necessary to hold 
utilities accountable for meeting the RPS targets.  Accordingly, groups 
advocating for RPS requirements have recognized the importance of strong 
enforcement mechanisms.131  Even these advocates, though, are concerned 
about punishing utilities for factors beyond their control.132  A close 
examination of RPS requirements demonstrates that with a revision of the 
viability requirements for contracts, the situations outside of utilities’ 
126. See Powers, supra  note 118, at19, 20.
127. Id. (discussing utility incentives for larger generation).
128. See A. Brown & J. Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving
Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L.
REV. 705 (2010).   
129. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report (Jan.
2008). 
130. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Clean Energy Future Implementation Plan at 23
(Sept. 2010). 
131. A Strong Clean Energy for California (Aug. 2010), http://www.ucsusa.org/
assets/documents/clean_energy/33_percent_res.pdf. 
132. Id.
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control will be minimized, enabling more effective enforcement of the RPS. 
Other states have taken more authority to help assure that RPS goals 
are met.  For example, some states have taken back siting authority from 
local zoning boards to oversee siting for renewable energy development.133  
California needs to pass provisions that allow for strong enforcement of RPS 
requirements rather than relying on its current flexible provisions.   
Initially, California should include provisions that discourage unviable 
projects from being offered.  Texas has successfully required contract terms 
that penalize construction delays and other types of operational issues.134  
These provisions have helped eliminate incentives for proposing projects 
that are likely to prove unviable.135  In addition to eliminating incentives for 
unviable projects, Texas’s renewable projects have also been shown to be 
cost competitive.136  California utilities have spent a significant amount of 
time and resources on unviable projects.  Part of this failure is due to 
developers not having sufficient experience or funding to complete the 
projects.137  By requiring compliance with strict contract requirements, 
California can likely minimize the amount of contract failures due to 
developer issues, which will in turn reduce the cost of renewable 
development. 
In addition to strengthening the contract requirements, California 
should enact strong enforcement requirements that hold utilities 
accountable for not meeting targets.  California is currently unable to deter 
or prevent utilities from failing to meet their RPS targets because of the 
state’s flexible enforcement approach and associated low-penalty 
provisions.  Many of these provisions were enacted because the Legislature 
held the view that some issues are out of control of the investor-owned 
utilities.138  Strong contract requirements and increased knowledge have 
changed this.  High renewable usage levels have been achieved and the 
body of knowledge related to renewable energy development has grown 
exponentially since California’s RPS targets were originally enacted, calling 
into question the original consensus supporting the “flexible” approach to 
RPS enforcement.   
In addition to strengthening enforcement of the RPS targets, California 
133. See Residents Opposed to Kittitas Turbines v. State Energy Facilities Site Evaluation
Council, 197 P.3d 1153 (Wash. 2008) (upholding state law that overrides local zoning 
decision to prohibit wind development); Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: 
Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 271 (2008).   
134. See Langniss & Wiser, supra note 64, at 538.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Renewables Portfolio Standard Quarterly Report (Apr.
2008).   
138. See supra at Section II(B).
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could enact a policy that utilities should not be allowed to continue to 
recover money from ratepayers for all new fossil fuel contracts above the 
planning reserve margin if they are failing to meet their renewable 
requirements.  This would also help alleviate California’s extraordinarily 
high reserve margin levels.   
B. California Needs to Conduct an Independent Analysis to
Determine How to Integrate Renewables
Utilities have a strong economic incentive to develop new expensive 
facilities because rate recovery is based in part on capital expenditures.139  
Due to this incentive, utilities are not economically encouraged to evaluate 
all possible options for integrating renewables such as increased energy 
efficiency.140  Thus, current economic incentives do not sufficiently 
encourage innovative renewable energy development rather than other most 
cost effective solutions.141  Consequently, instead of relying on utilities, 
regulators need to carefully examine how to integrate renewable energy 
resources and whether additional fossil fuel facilities are actually necessary 
to back them up.142  This is particularly true when utilities have incentives to 
request large-scale renewable projects that require significant capital 
investment.143   
Importantly, it is not clear that any additional new facilities will be 
needed to integrate renewables in California for many years.  In fact, it 
appears that the CPUC has already allowed too many facilities to be 
developed since California is currently operating with an extraordinarily 
large reserve margin and several more fossil fuel facilities are scheduled to 
139. See Powers, supra note 118, at 20.
140. See T. Duane, Greening the Grid in California, 25 NATURAL RESOURCES &
ENVIRONMENT 31, 34 (2010) (“Another consequence is that the RPS then fails to further 
longer-term technology development, which is critical to reducing costs while 
improving renewable generation performance reliability.”).   
141. Id. (concluding that “[p]rice incentives alone are, therefore, not sufficient
for steady development and deployment of new technologies - unless they are so 
high that they overcome all risks for technology and project developers.”).   
142. See, e.g., S. Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate
New Renewable Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977 (2009). 
143. See, e.g., M. Dorsi, Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC, 34 HARVARD
ENVTL. LAW REVIEW 593, 600 (2010) (NGOs and government agencies “will need to 
develop and maintain expertise to determine when transmission actually supports 
renewable energy.”); Duane, supra note 140, at 34 (“A multiattribute evaluative system 
is preferred over a price-only evaluation because some green power is worth a lot 
more than other green power, but its value may not be captured in monetized 
bidding systems where competing technologies are compared on price alone.”).     
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come online in the near future.144  Contrary to this trend, the reliance on 
natural gas plants will need to decrease for California to achieve its RPS 
goals.  A 2003 study by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found that 
California would need to reduce natural gas plant capacity to meet the 
proposed requirement to get 33% of electricity from renewable energy. 145 
If backup capacity is necessary, all options that are potentially 
available and being developed should be examined to determine the best 
way to back up renewables.146  Even if additional backup is needed, energy 
storage is a better backup for renewable energy than new facilities.  In fact, 
as a recent analysis found, “storage can achieve better performance in the 
system per MW installed [for backing up renewable energy] than regulation 
from conventional generation.”147  Storage also provides significant 
environmental benefits because it avoids greenhouse gases associated with 
increased use of combustion turbines.148   
Importantly, the CEC has acknowledged the role of storage technology 
in planning for the integration of intermittent renewable generation: 
“looking forward, some of the firming services provided by gas-fired 
generation will need to come from existing and emerging energy storage 
technologies that allow generators and transmission operators to fill the gap 
between the time of generation (off-peak) and the time of need (on-peak) for 
intermittent renewable energy.”149  That CEC report similarly concluded that 
storage could replace the number of natural gas power plants that are 
required to backup the system,150 and that the technology has advanced to 
the extent that several technologies will be able to provide utility-size 
144. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Decision 10.07.045 (Concurrence of D.
Gruenich).  
145. See Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., California’s Electricity Generation and
Transmission Interconnection Needs Under Alternative Scenarios, CEC 500-03-106, available at 
http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/ca-scenarios.pdf.  
146. See Int’l Energy Agency, Empowering Variable Renewables: Options for Flexible
Electricity Systems 14 (2008), available at http://195.200.115.136/g8/2008/ 
Empowering_Variable_Renewables.pdf. 
147. KEMA, Inc., Research Evaluation of Wind Generation, Solar Generation, and Storage
Impact on the California Grid Prepared for the CEC 4, 7 (June 2010), available at http://www. 
energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC-500-2010-010/CEC-500-2010-010.PDF. 
148. See KEMA, Inc., supra note 147, at 76.
149. Cal. Energy Comm’n, 2009 Integrated Energy Policy Report 192 (Dec. 16,
2009), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-100-2009-003/CEC-100-2009-
003-CMF.PDF; see also id. at 86 (“Other solutions [aside from natural-gas plants] such
as energy storage and hybrid renewable plants, are also possible and could be
preferable in the longer term as more aggressive climate mitigation targets are
addressed.”).
150. Id. at 6, 192; see also id. at 86 (“[b]attery energy storage technology has
improved over time to the point where there are several emerging battery 
technologies that can provide utility-scale energy storage.”). 
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storage.151 
Consideration of energy storage systems for integrating renewables is 
essential because several energy storage systems are already operating and 
being developed in California.  For example, the Southern California Public 
Power Authority signed an agreement with Ice Energy in January 2010 to 
install 53 MW of load-shifting storage capacity this year.152  In addition, a 2 
MW battery storage project in Huntington Beach has been operational since 
2008.153  Moreover, there are several other energy storage projects being 
planned and implemented throughout California.154 
Not only are energy storage projects a potential alternative for 
integrating renewables that are under development, but they can also be a 
more cost-effective backup than fossil fuel plants.155  Energy storage has 
many possible economic benefits.  Renewable capacity firming is one such 
benefit, which involves the use of storage so that the combined renewable 
energy generation with storage is “somewhat-to-very constant.”156  The value 
of this benefit has been estimated to be $709-$915 per kW, or in broader 
terms, a potential benefit to the U.S. economy in the amount of $29.9 billion 
($2.3 billion for California).157  The same report includes an analysis of 
sixteen other benefits, detailing the impressive potential economic impact 
on energy storage integration.158  The inclusion and consideration of these 
benefits in the comparison with gas-peaker plants and other forms of peak 
generation is a vital step towards fairly seeking the most cost effective 
electricity supply solutions during the LTPP process.  
Notably, the CPUC staff recommended that it: “[c]onsider explicitly 
151. Id. at 86.
152. S. Cal. Pub. Power Auth./Ice Energy Joint Press Release, Southern California
Public Power Authority to Undertake Industry’s Largest Utility-Scale Distributed Energy Storage 
Project (Jan. 27, 2010. 
153. See D. Kilish, AES Corp., Energy Storage Role in Smart Grid: CPUC Smart Grid
Rulemaking, Integration of Renewables and Energy Storage, at slide 2 (June 2009), available  
at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/FF391276-27FB-4BA3-80FF-6EFBC5EF5948/0/ 
DaurenKilishAES.pdf. 
154. See Janice Lin, Cal. Energy Storage Alliance, Imperative of Energy Storage for
Meeting California’s Clean Energy Needs, at slide 38 (May 6, 2010), available  
at http://storagealliance.org/presentations/StrateGen_CESA_ESA_Presentation_2010-
05-06.pdf.
155. Cal. Energy Storage Alliance, Energy Storage: A Cheaper and Cleaner Alternative
to Natural Gas Peakers 2 (June 2010), available at http://storagealliance.org/ 
whystorage.html. 
156. Jim Eyer & Garth Corey, Sandia Nat’l Labs., Energy Storage for the Electricity
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placing EES [electricity energy storage] within the state’s energy resource 
loading order and require utilities to incorporate EES in their integrated 
resource planning processes.”159  This should occur soon as the California 
legislature recently passed AB 2514, requiring the Commission to consider 
energy storage issues, ensuring the fair and completion evaluation of these 
issues.160   
Beyond just providing greater energy storage capacity, existing 
facilities can also be modified to provide backup resources.  As described by 
the CAISO, intermittent renewables create a need for resources that have 
quick start-up and ramping times.161  For many current facilities, software 
upgrades can increase the start and stop time of these facilities.162  In 
particular, the available technology optimizes the “combustion process,” 
allowing for faster and more efficient startup.163  The software has been used 
in other facility upgrades resulting in increased abilities to startup faster.164  
Considering these types of upgrades to current facilities could lower the 
need for resources necessary to integrate renewable.  The upgrades could 
also lower potential transmission needs by reducing the need to site new 
facilities online. 
C. California Needs to Increase Its Focus on Small
Distributed Generation Projects  That Do Not Require
Transmission Upgrades
One of the primary reasons cited for project failure in California is 
transmission issues.  Transmission questions arise over how lines should be 
159. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Electric Energy Storage: An Assessment of Potential
Barriers and Opportunities, Policy and Planning Division Staff White Paper 9 (July 9, 2010), 
available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/reports.htm.   
160. A.B. 2514, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (approved by the Assembly
in June 2010); Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to 
Assembly Bill 2514 to Consider the Adoption of Procurement Targets for Viable and 
Cost-Effective Energy Storage Systems, Rulemaking 10-12-007 (Dec. 16, 2010), 
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/proceedings/R1012007.htm. 
161. Letter from Jim McIntosh, Dir. of Renewable Res. Integration, Cal. Indep.
Sys. Operator, to Pres. & Comm’rs, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Re: A.09-10-022 and 
A.09-10-034 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/EXP/113557.pdf.
162. See, e.g., Siemens A.G., Integrated Technologies that Enhance Power Plant
Operating Flexibility (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.energy.siemens.com/hq/pool/hq/ 
energy-topics/pdfs/en/combined-cycle-power-plants/PowerGen2007PaperFinal_.pdf. 
163. See Gen. Elec. Co., Ecomagination: OpFlex Turndown Technology, available at
http://ge.ecomagination.com/products/opflex-turndown.html (last visited March 13, 
2011). 
164. See Combined Cycle Journal, First Quarter 2008 at 14-16, available at
http://www.combinedcyclejournal.com/1Q2008/1Q2008-1/108Award-p.3-27.pdf.   
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paid for and who decides whether a line should be sited.165  The complexity 
of these questions and issues can delay potential transmission projects for 
several years.166  Many of these transmission issues are a direct result of 
California’s overreliance on large utility scale projects proposed by utilities 
instead of smaller distributed generation projects.167  In addition to the 
transmission issues, large projects can have other negative impacts 
including high water usage, which is a major impediment to development of 
large solar plants since the best solar resources are in areas that are 
generally dry.168 
Regulators are just starting to realize the many benefits of smaller 
distributed generation projects.  The CPUC recently acknowledged the 
benefits of smaller distributed generation facilities, which include the 
“relative ease and certainty of deployment that these facilities offer.”169  The 
ease of deployment is because “these facilities can be located close to load 
without the need for transmission additions, and may face fewer 
environmental barriers and public opposition than large scale projects.”170  
Consequently, “it is reasonable to conclude that development of smaller 
projects can be accomplished more quickly and with less risk than larger 
facilities.”171  Further, the California Clean Energy Future Implementation 
Plan recognized that distributed generation reduces transmission costs and 
losses at peak time, which could help “avoid the need for new power plants 
or expansion of existing plants.”172 
The idea that solar photovoltaic distributed generation is a viable 
replacement for a natural gas peaker plant was also recognized by the CEC 
stating:  
Photovoltaic arrays mounted on existing flat warehouse roofs or 
165. See Duane, supra note 140, at 35-36.
166. See, e.g., A Battle for California’s Energy Future, DESERT REPORT (June 2008)
(detailing the long battle over the Sunrise Powerlink Transmission siting), available at 
http://www.desertreport.org/?s=sunrise.   
167. See Powers, supra note 118 (detailing California’s overreliance on large
renewable facilities).  
168. Bill Powers, PV Pulling Ahead, But Why Pay Transmission Costs?, NATURAL GAS 
& ELECTRICITY (Oct. 2009), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/EXP/119165.pdf. 
169. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Decision, D.10-04-052 at 19 (Apr. 2010), available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/WORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISION/117115.pdf.  
170. Id. at 16.
171. Id. at 17.
172. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Clean Energy Future Implementation Plan at 55
(Sept. 2010) (recognizing that other instruments are necessary to achieve high levels 
of distributed generation: “Policies, such as feed-in tariffs for small scale generation, 
are being expanded to encourage installation of renewable distributed generation 
sized to serve demand within a local neighborhood.”). 
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on top of vehicle shelters in parking lots do not consume any 
acreage. The warehouses and parking lots continue to perform 
those functions with the PV in place. . . . In addition, while PV is 
not a quick-start technology which can be dispatched on ten 
minutes’ notice any time of the day or night, PV does provide 
power at a time when demand is likely to be high - on hot, sunny 
days.173 
Also contributing to the positive aspects of solar photovoltaic facilities 
is that it has dropped greatly in price, which has resulted in distributed solar 
PV being equivalent to central station solar PV, yet which can be developed 
in a much shorter time frame.174  Another benefit of distributed generation is 
that geographical diversity increases the likelihood that solar power will be 
available when needed.175  California should take positive steps to encourage 
further development of distributed generation by recognizing all of these 
benefits through incentive programs.  Further, California should recognize 
that distributed generation provides a way to meet renewable goals while 
minimizing investment in transmission and costs of development to the 
environment.   
V. Conclusion
California can maintain a leadership role in the renewable energy
arena if it takes a hard look at why it failed to meet its renewable target. 
This leadership role will be possible if it determines a concrete way to meet 
its RPS goals in the future and enacts strong enforcement requirements that 
are administered by a central agency, which assures that decisions are based 
on independent assessments of issues. 
173. Cal. Energy Comm’n, Final Commission Decision, Chula Vista Energy
Upgrade Project, 07-AFC-4, at 29 (June 2009), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
2009publications/CEC-800-2009-001/CEC-800-2009-001-CMF.PDF. 
174. See T. Woody, Transmission Constraints Derail Solar Project, GRIST (June 28,
2010), http://www.grist.org/article/transmission-constraints-derail-solar-project. 
175. Andrew Mills & Ryan Wiser, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,
Implications of Wide-Area Geographic Diversity for Short-Term Variability of Solar Power (Sept. 
2010), http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-3884e.pdf. 
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